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SAMENVATTING 
Dit onderzoeksrapport is het eerste van een reeks studies die de effecten van de 
zogenaamde economische groeilanden op ontwikkelingssamenwerkingsbeleid 
bestuderen. Het rapport beschrijft op basis van een literatuurstudie de kenmerken (de 
geschiedenis en de onderliggende principes; de actoren; en de modaliteiten, 
beleidsinstrumenten en domeinen) van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking van Brazilië, 
India, China en Zuid Afrika, in de sectoren van gezondheid en landbouw en 
voedselzekerheid. Elk hoofdstuk behandelt een land.  
Samenvattend kunnen we stellen dat het beleid en de activiteiten van deze vier landen 
in de twee sectoren in grote mate wordt bepaald door hun algemene beleid inzake 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Onderstaande tabel vat de conclusies samen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Table 0.1  Belangrijkste kenmerken van ontwikkelingssamenwerking van Brazilië, 
India, China en Zuid Afrika 
 
 Brazilië India China Zuid Afrika 
Hulp (in US$) Schattingen variëren 
tussen 362 miljoen 
(2009) en 1,2 miljard 
(2010) 
Schattingen 
variëren tussen 
639 miljoen (2009) 
en 1,48 miljard 
(2007) 
Schattingen variëren 
tussen 2 miljard 
(2010) en 3,1 miljard 
(2008) 
Veel verwarring, 
schattingen rond 
US$ 100 miljoen 
     
Institutionele 
overheids-
structuur 
(belangrijkste 
actor) 
Gefragmenteerd; 
uitvoering in handen van 
sectorale actoren  
(Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken en 
Agência Brasileira do 
Cooperação) 
Zeer 
gefragmenteerd en 
onderhevig aan 
veranderingsproces
sen  
(Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse 
Zaken) 
Zeer gecentraliseerde 
structuur, maar de 
uitvoering is 
gedecentraliseerd 
(Departement van 
Buitenlandse Hulp en 
het Ministerie van 
Handel) 
In een veranderings-
proces 
(Departement van 
Internationale Relaties 
en Samenwerking en in 
de toekomst het Zuid-
Afrikaanse Partner-
agentschap) 
     
Principes Solidariteit, wederzijdse 
baten, vraaggestuurd, 
geen voorwaarden, geen 
inmenging, erkenning 
van lokale expertise 
Solidariteit, weder-
zijdse baten 
Gelijkheid, weder-
zijdse baten, respect 
voor soevereiniteit, 
geen voorwaarden, 
nadruk op zelfred-
zaamheid, zelfde 
levensstandaarden 
voor Chinese en 
lokale deskundigen 
Solidariteit, wederzijdse 
baten, ‘Ubuntu’ 
     
Belangrijkste 
financiële 
instrumenten 
Concessionele leningen 
en giften 
Exportkredieten, 
concessionele le-
ningen en giften. 
Integratie van 
commerciële en 
hulpfinanciering 
Giften, kredieten, 
leningen vrij van inte-
resten, concessionele 
leningen, maar zoge-
naamde andere 
Officiële 
Financieringsstromen 
belangrijker dan 
Officiële 
Ontwikkelingshulp. 
Integratie van 
commerciële en hulp-
financiering 
Giften en leningen 
     
Belangrijkste 
modaliteiten 
Technische assistentie, 
beurzen, humanitaire 
hulp, wereldwijde 
beleidsbeïnvloeding 
Technische 
assistentie, 
beurzen, 
humanitaire hulp 
‘Complete projecten’, 
technische 
assistentie, uitrusting, 
capaciteitsopbouw 
noodhulp, vrijwilligers-
programma’s 
Projecten, technische 
assistentie, humanitaire 
hulp 
     
Belangrijkste 
soorten van 
samenwer-
king 
Bilateraal, multilateraal 
en trilateraal 
Bilateraal Bilateraal Bilateraal, multilateraal, 
trilateraal 
     
Landen Latijns Amerika en 
Afrikaanse landen (vooral 
Portugeessprekende) 
Buurlanden en 
Afrika 
Wereldwijd, maar 
Afrika in toenemende 
mate 
Afrika 
     
Belangrijkste 
sectoren 
Gezondheid, onderwijs, 
landbouw, sociale 
zekerheid  
Landbouw, infra-
structuur, econo-
mische sectoren en 
ICT 
Infrastructuur, 
productieve sectoren, 
landbouw, energie, 
landbouw en gezond-
heidszorg 
Post-conflict resolutie, 
vredesopbouw, 
regionale integratie 
 
Sectorspecifieke informatie, en dan vooral inzake budgetten, is maar gedeeltelijk 
beschikbaar. De volgende tabel somt de belangrijkste bevindingen op.  
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 Brazilië India China Zuid Afrika 
Hulp voor 
gezond-
heids-, 
landbouw- en 
voedsel-
zekerheid 
Geen informatie beschikbaar over de totale budgetten voor specifieke sectoren voor de landen. Enkel 
gedeeltelijke informatie over bepaalde projecten, specifieke soorten van hulp en leningen.  
  
     
Belangrijkste 
overheids-
actoren  
Gefragmenteerd, maar 
de belangrijkste actoren 
zijn Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 
Agência Brasileira do 
Cooperação, Ministerie 
van Gezondheid, Fiocruz 
voor gezondheid, 
Ministerie van Landbouw 
en Veeteelt, Ministerie 
van Agrarische 
Ontwikkeling en Embrapa 
voor landbouw 
Onduidelijk, 
alhoewel Ministerie 
van Buitenlandse 
Zaken een 
belangrijke rol 
speelt 
Gecentraliseerd, 
Departement van 
Buitenlandse Hulp, 
Ministerie van handel, 
Ministerie van 
gezondheid en van 
landbouw 
Departement van 
Internationale Relaties 
en Samenwerking en in 
de toekomst het Zuid-
Afrikaanse Partner-
agentschap 
     
Belangrijkste 
modaliteiten 
Technische assistentie, 
beurzen, onderzoek en 
ontwikkeling, trilaterale 
samenwerkingsprojecten, 
export van binnenlandse 
sociale programma’s, 
wereldwijde diplomatie 
Krediet, 
concessionele 
leningen, beurzen 
Complete projecten, 
krediet, technische 
assistentie 
(landbouw-
demonstratiecentra, 
medische en 
landbouwteams), 
concessionele 
leningen, beurzen, 
onderzoek 
Infrastructuur 
     
Belangrijkste 
domeinen in 
landbouw en 
voedsel-
zekerheid 
Landbouwproductie, 
agro-business, 
kleinschalige landbouw, 
voedselprogramma’s 
katoen 
Katoen, ‘frugal’ 
innovatie, ICT 
Landbouwproductie, 
agro-business, klein-
schalige landbouw 
 
     
Belangrijkste 
domeinen in 
gezondheid 
Infrastructuur 
(ziekenhuizen, 
farmaceutische 
fabrieken), HIV/AIDS, 
medicijnen, openbare 
gezondheidszorg, 
tabakscontrole 
ICT, 
telegeneeskunde, 
frugal innovation, 
aanmaak en ver-
schaffen van medi-
cijnen 
Malariacontrole, 
reproductieve 
gezondheidszorg, 
aanmaak en ver-
schaffen van medi-
cijnen 
HIV/AIDS 
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PREFACE 
 
This paper presents a literature review of what is known about the characteristics of 
development cooperation in the sectors health and agriculture and food security (AFS) 
of four so-called emerging powers or economies: Brazil, India, China and South Africa. 
This is the first paper in a series within the four year research (2012-2015) ‘Challenging 
the status-quo? The impact of the emerging economies on the global governance of 
development cooperation’. The research is commissioned by the Flemish Government 
and framed within the Flemish Policy Research Centre for Foreign Affairs, International 
Entrepreneurship and Development Cooperation and carried out by the Bel¬gian 
Research Institute for Work and Society (HIVA).  
 
In recent years, Brazil, India, China and South Africa have gained considerable 
academic, policy and media attention for their activities in development cooperation. 
Some authors argue that these countries employ innovative and alternative 
approaches to development cooperation than the tra¬ditional, i.e. OECD-DAC donors.  
For instance, the approaches of the BICS would be more suited to the realities and 
context of African countries and based on their own solutions and experiences to 
address their own development challenges and the partnership would be equal in 
nature, instead of a donor-recipient relationship. Other authors question these 
conclusions and frame the efforts of the BICS in political self-interest. However, there is 
a shortage of on the ground tangible evidence to support or rebut these conclusions, 
especially in the above-mentioned sectors and countries. 
 
Hence, the research examines the characteristics (actors, motivation, objectives, 
means, methods) of Brazil, India, China and South Africa (BICS) and their effects on 
the organisation and methods of development cooperation in general and western 
donors in particular. Specific attention is given to development cooperation in health in 
Mozambique, and agriculture and food security in Malawi. These are among the 
primary focus areas and partner countries of the Flemish development coop¬eration. 
The specific objectives of the research include: (1) to identify the activities and of the 
BICS in health in Mozambique and agriculture and food security in Malawi; (2) to 
identify lessons from the BICS’ experiences and approaches to render the Flemish 
development cooperation more effec¬tive; (3) to identify avenues for future information 
sharing, coordination or collaboration with the one or more of the BICS; (4) to inform 
the Malawian and Mozambican government; (5) to enhance academic knowledge. 
 
These first two papers are literature reviews. This paper presents four country studies 
and looks for the BICS’ involvement in health and agriculture and food security (AFS), 
while the second research paper describes the main features of these countries’ 
general development cooperation approaches. The third and fourth research papers 
focus on the involvement of the BICS in the agriculture and food security sector in 
Malawi and the health sector in Mozambique. The current and future results of the 
research are presented on the website of the Policy Research Centre.  
 
To stay within the metaphor of the title of this paper, one could say that development 
cooperation has been for decades a typical western dish, using primarily European, 
Northern American and Australian ingredients. In the last decade the menu has 
diversified with recipes using primarily spices from India, Brazil, South Africa and 
China. This paper describes the dishes, recipes and spices used by these four 
countries. Future studies within this four year research will complement the information 
from existing cooking books with the exploration of the actual taste of the dishes. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABC Agência Brasileira de Cooperação - Brazilian Cooperation 
Agency 
AFS Agriculture and Food Security 
ANC African National Congress 
ARF African Renaissance Fund 
ARV Antiretroviral 
AU African Union 
BICS Brazil, India, China and South Africa 
BNDES Brazilian Development Bank 
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa 
CPLP Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa 
CSO Civil Society Organisation 
DAC Development Assistance Committee 
DBSA Development Bank of Southern Africa 
DFID Department for International Development 
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FOCAC Forum on China - Africa Cooperation 
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation 
GFATM Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
GHP Global health partnership 
GNI Gross National Income 
IBSA India, Brazil, South Africa 
IDC Industrial Development Cooperation 
IIDCA India International Development Cooperation Agency 
ILO International Labour Organisation 
ITEC Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation 
MEA Ministry of Economic Affairs 
MRE Ministério das RelaçÕes Exteriores 
NAM Non-Alignment Movement 
NEPAD New partnership for Africa’s Development 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
ODA Official Development Assistance 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PRC People’s Republic of China 
SACU Southern African Customs Union 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SADPA South African Development Partnership Agency 
SSC South-South Cooperation 
TB Tuberculosis 
TCDC Technical Cooperation among Development Countries 
TRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNFAO United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation 
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund 
WFP World Food programme 
WHO World Health Organisation 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last decade development cooperation has been heavily criticised by various 
authors and institutions. The criticism mainly entailed so-called ‘traditional’ 
development actors, i.e. member states of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
governmental and multilateral donors and Non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
These players have increasingly witnessed the entry of new actors in their domain, 
resulting not only in new possibilities for cooperation, but also in competition and even 
conflict (Develtere, 2012). Brazil, India, China and South Africa (the BICS) are among 
the most talked about countries that challenge the ‘hegemony’ of the traditional 
development donors with their own international cooperation. Despite increasing 
attention among academicians and policy makers, little tangible and evidence based 
information is available about the characteristics and importance of these actors for 
development cooperation, neither about the match between discourse and practice of 
the BICS. To address this knowledge gap a four year research entitled ‘Challenging the 
status-quo? The impact of the emerging economies on the global governance of devel-
opment cooperation’ is carried out between 2012 and 2015, funded by the Flemish 
Government. It includes a comparative case study research in which the governmental 
development cooperation approaches and the importance of the BICS for national 
governmental and traditional donor actors are examined in the health sector in 
Mozambique and the agricultural and food security sector in Malawi. These sectors and 
countries were chosen on the basis of an initial literature study review and mail survey 
among academic and policy experts. In addition, the selection had to take into account 
the potential relevance for the Flemish Government (Flemish development cooperation 
focuses on South Africa, Mozambique and Malawi).1 
 
The findings of the research will be presented in a series of papers, of which this is the 
first. Before venturing in the case studies in Malawi and Mozambique, it is important to 
have an understanding of the development cooperation characteristics of the BICS in 
the health and agriculture and food security sector in general.2 The paper presents the 
results of the search for information on these sectors in the literature and in policy 
documents. However, country and sector specific information is not easy to come by. 
Many studies have been focusing in first instance on describing the general 
development cooperation policies of the BICS or of the separate countries. Only 
recently interest has been given to sector studies. The search is also inhibited by the 
limited amount of policy documents of some countries (esp. India and South Africa) or 
of the limited interest in these sectors (e.g. South Africa). Moreover, the literature and 
policy document review showed that the sectorial approaches of the BICS are to a very 
large extent part and parcel of the general development cooperation approach of the 
BICS. To be able to understand the BICS’ development cooperation in the selected 
sectors (or absence in these sectors) it was necessary to give considerable attention to 
the overall development cooperation policies.  
 
                                                     
1
 The overall methodology and methods of this four year research will be the subject of a future paper. 
2
 The second paper entitled “Challenging Development Cooperation?” gives a general overview of the 
characteristics of the development cooperation approaches of the non-DAC development actors, and 
elaborates on some of the most important issues. The third and fourth research papers entail a description 
of the BICS involvement in respectively the agriculture and food security sector in Malawi and the health 
sector in Mozambique. 
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The paper is divided in four country chapters and it aims to give the reader an 
understanding of the main features of each country’s development cooperation in 
health and agriculture and food security (AFS). The chapters are roughly organised in 
three headings (historic evolution and principles; actors; and modalities, instruments 
and thematic areas), while the subheadings highlight the most important 
characteristics. The conclusion gives a schematic overview of the BICS’ development 
cooperation (1) in general and (2) in the selected sectors. The second research paper 
builds further on the findings of this paper and focuses on similarities and differences 
between the BICS development cooperation.  
 
Sources of information 
 
General overviews on the health sector are given by a 2012 publication of the Global 
Health Strategies Initiatives, an international non-profit organisation that lobbies for 
better access to health services and technologies in developing countries. The Future 
Agricultures Consortium, a collaboration of several international research institutes, 
provided valuable information on AFS.  
 
For China there is a large body of literature. Brautigam is by no means the only 
researcher who has sought out fact from fiction in recent years and deconstructed 
persistent rumours, but she is arguably the most cited or influential author. 
Interestingly, the international academic literature on Chinese development cooperation 
is still dominated by non-Chinese researchers - although this is changing rapidly, an 
evolution that also the aforementioned authors try to stimulate. This is a marked 
difference when comparing the literature on Brazil, South Africa or India, where also 
domestic specialists are guiding the international debate. In this paper we will not go 
into possible explanations (language; different academic practices; political system), 
but it is an important issue to keep in mind when analyzing the available information. 
 
Brazil’s development cooperation is receiving increasing attention. Besides official 
governmental documents, country-specific information sources were amongst other 
given by Lidia Cabral and her colleagues for agriculture and Russo et al. and articles of 
the Brazilian health journal RECIIS for health.  
 
India and South Africa are much less researched and documented. For instance, there 
is a great lack of literature about Indian cooperation in agriculture, notwithstanding the 
fact that it is a relatively important sector in India’s total development cooperation. 
Partly this is due to the relatively new international attention, as well as the renewed 
attention for the policy field in these countries, and - for South Africa - the limited 
attention for AFS and health in their development cooperation. Publications of Sachin 
Chaturvedi were an important source for this paper for India and Vickers for South 
Africa. 
 
Terminology: development cooperation 
 
This paper focuses on development cooperation, but actually it might be more correct 
to say: ‘in the policy field which has become known as development cooperation in the 
‘DAC world’. ‘Development cooperation’ is indeed a western concept, although as 
Mawdsley (2012: 81) asserts, ‘different actors use [development cooperation] in 
different ways, and there is no agreed or single definition’. One of the common features 
of the BICS is that they do not belong to the DAC. Of the 34 members of the OECD, 
23 countries are member of the Development Assistance Committee (the EU being the 
24th member). Besides South Korea and Japan, all members are from the West. Since 
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its foundation the OECD-DAC has been central in setting the discourse and modalities 
in development cooperation. As such the DAC countries and older multilateral and 
civilateral organisations are considered by some authors to belong to the traditional 
development world and the non-DAC countries as non-traditional (Mawdsley, 2012). 
This paper intends to identify how the BICS understand this concept (and what they 
offer as alternatives) and consequently which actors and approaches exist that are 
aimed at promoting political, social, economic or technical cooperation with Latin 
American, African or Asian countries in order to achieve development. What kind of 
development is dependent on the definition given by the actors involved? Importantly, 
the focus of the paper is thus not only development assistance or aid, as understood as 
Official Development Aid (ODA), but goes beyond this and entails also other kinds of 
cooperation and assistance3.  
 
Important to note is that Brazil, India, China and South Africa are referred to as ‘BICS’. 
However, we stress that this does not at all imply that these countries act or should be 
seen as a homogeneous block or entity. The only reason why this abbreviation is used 
in this paper is for reasons of brevity. For the same reason, ‘the BICS’ is used, 
meaning ‘the countries belonging to group of countries of Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa’, but admittedly a construction that can be contested from a grammatical 
point of view. To avoid confusion with the acronym BRICS or BRIC, we emphasise that 
the Russian Federation (the letter R in the acronym) is not included in this study and 
the four year research. This decisions is not only made for reasons of scale (else the 
research would include yet an extra country), but also because Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa all share an important history of receivers of aid and share a number of 
similar development challenges (Kragelund, 2010). 
 
  
                                                     
3
 In the second research paper: “Challenging Development Cooperation?” these issues are elaborated 
upon. 
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1. BRAZIL 
 
1.1 Historic evolution and principles 
 
1.1.1 Long history, but intensification from 2003 onwards 
 
Brazil has gained an increasing amount of attention in recent years for its efforts in 
development cooperation, and more specifically in health and agricultural assistance. 
This might mask the fact that Brazil has in fact decades of experience in cooperating 
with other developing countries. Already in the 1950s it funded projects and 
programmes in Africa and Latin America (Costa Vaz & Inoue, 2007). In the following 
decades it signed bilateral agreements with several countries on these continents and 
manifested itself as a major player within international institutions and initiatives, 
especially those that represented the Third World (Vidigal, 2010). Development 
cooperation became even more important within Brazilian foreign policy after the 
Buenos Aires Action Plan of 1978 which focused on Technical Cooperation among 
Development Countries (TCDC) and introduced the concept of horizontal cooperation 
(Sato, 2010). Before 1978 Brazil had approved 28 projects involving technical 
cooperation between developing countries, while in the 1980s this figure went up to 
600.  
 
However, the current policy shows indeed marked differences with that of the previous 
decade, states (Vidigal, 2010). The major turning point in Brazil’s development 
cooperation came in 2003, with the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Although 
also his predecessors used development cooperation as a foreign policy instrument, it 
is during Lula’s reign that it was a central element of forging economic bilateral ties with 
developing countries and gaining global economic and political power. According to the 
same author, this process cannot be separated from Brazil’s wider social and economic 
context. In the 2000s the country’s economy flourished and the government developed 
and executed a number of ground-breaking social policies to redistribute part of this 
economic growth. 
 
1.1.2 Horizontal cooperation (in theory) and pursuit of national interests 
 
Brazil’s assistance in health and AFS is guided by the principles of Brazil’s overall 
development cooperation policy. The country inserts itself in a horizontal cooperation 
(as opposed to the vertical donor-recipient relationships of the DAC countries), which is 
mutually beneficial for all partners (Cabral & Shankland, 2012; Inoue & Costa Vaz, 
2012). Its central principles include (ABC, 2011): 
 
 joint diplomacy based on solidarity; 
 demand driven action, based on demands from developing countries; 
 recognition of local experience and adaptation of Brazilian experience; 
 non-conditionality; 
 no interference with commercial interests of profit; 
 respect of sovereignty of partner countries. 
 
To what extent the practices on the field match the official discours is still subject of 
debate and ongoing research and needs further scrutiny. In agriculture, researchers 
attached to the Future Agricultures Consortium are trying to shed light on this issue. 
Another author, Torronteguy (2010), has examined the health component in 
176 bilateral agreements (of which 167 were in force at the time of the research) 
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between Brazil and the Portuguese speaking African countries (PALOP). He concluded 
that the claim of horizontal cooperation should be nuanced (ab ibid.: 60). 
 
‘It is true that there is horizontality, since there are no conditions in the agreement, 
nor the debt of African countries, unlike what often occurs in the North-South 
cooperation. However, the content of the planned activities in the bilateral acts 
indicates a one-way path, by which African country assumes a passive position in the 
transference - which therefore can hardly be called an exchange of knowledge. This 
one-way path indicates that horizontality is not complete in the current model of 
South-South cooperation implemented by Brazil. Therefore, it is concluded that the 
current Brazil-PALOP cooperation is formally horizontal and substantially vertical.’’ 
 
According to the author this is however not necessary negative, as long as the 
Brazilian intention is to overcome social inequality and strive for sustainability. 
According to him the Brazilian approach ‘reveals a more balanced situation than that of 
the North-South cooperation’ (ab ibid.: 60). However, it is unclear on which he bases 
this conclusion. Other authors argue that Brazil’s policy caters in first instance for 
national interests, more specifically to gain importance and power on the international 
governance level, including a seat in the UN Security Council to forge economic ties 
with other countries and to promote private investment, and to raise the image of the 
country (GHSI, 2012). 
 
1.2 Actors 
 
1.2.1 Sector-specialised institutions are central for implementation 
 
Brazilian international cooperation is very fragmented. According to GHSI (2012) more 
than 65 entities would be involved in this policy domain. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MRE) is the main agency responsible for the formulation of Brazil’s foreign policy and 
international cooperation strategies, but also other sector-specific ministries develop 
their own strategies and have their own implementing agencies. However, Brazil does 
not have a legislation regulating the provision of development cooperation. Brazil is not 
allowed to give contributions for the benefit of other countries. This limits seriously the 
financial instruments used, as well as the performance of its development cooperation 
abroad, argue Cabral and Weinstock (2010).  
 
The Agência Brasileira de Cooperação – Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), residing 
under the MRE, is the official coordinating agency for the Brazilian international 
cooperation - incoming as well as outgoing. Importantly, it refers to technical 
cooperation, which only represents a small part of Brazil’s international cooperation. 
The ABC aims to contribute to the strengthening of Brazil’s relations with other 
Southern countries; the transfer of technical know-how; the promotion of capacity 
building; and the strengthening of governmental institutions (Hubner, 2012). The task of 
the ABC is to link agencies or other actors that request Brazilian cooperation with the 
appropriate Brazilian institutes specialised in the matter. Typically, projects and 
programmes originate from presidential or ministerial visits to partner countries, 
followed by diplomatic exchanges between Brazil and other countries or from specific 
meetings organised by the Brazilian government on certain topics. These are followed 
up by technical prospection visits organised by the ABC and a number of specialised 
institutions. Initiatives proposed to the ABC are evaluated against their probable 
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effects, the likelihood that they would improve living standards, the promotion of 
sustainable development and the contribution to social development. Attention is also 
given to the procedures to ensure the quality of the project negotiation, evaluation and 
management (Vidigal, 2010). In practice, the principle of demand drivenness must be 
nuanced. Brazilian officials actually offer a range of options on these missions 
(Cabral & Shankland, 2012). 
 
The ABC does not have financial autonomy or political power. Cabral and Shankland 
(2012: 6) describe it therefore as a ‘virtual department’. Some authors (for instance 
Burgers, 2011) even claim that the ABC with a staff of 160 - would not have sufficient 
resources and capacities to coordinate all international technical cooperation demands 
and efforts. The ABC does not have a large formal representation outside of Brazil, 
thus at the country level contacts are mostly made through the individual projects and 
diplomatic channels. While in the western donor agencies, development experts move 
to the recipient country, in the Brazilian international cooperation sector-specific 
specialists manage or carry out the projects (Glennie, 2012).  
 
Also in the health and the agricultural sectors technical cooperation is fragmented. The 
Ministry of Health designs the health cooperation policies, while the Oswaldo Cruz 
Foundation, also known as Fiocruz, is the main implementing partner (Almeida, 2010). 
Fiocruz, erected in 1900, is a world-reknown public health institution specialised in 
training, research, management of health programs and production of pharmaceuticals. 
It has about 20 research and technical institutes and units in Brazil, and opened an 
office in Maputo in 2008. In addition to Fiocruz, a specific office within the Ministry of 
Health and the Brazilian National Health Surveillance Agency also carry out interna-
tional cooperation activities, while the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science 
and Technology support activities indirectly (Russo et al., 2013). 
 
In agriculture more than 20 Brazilian institutions are involved in international 
cooperation (Cabral & Shankland, 2012). In addition several ministries are involved, 
such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply and the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development (the latter focuses specifically on food security). Embrapa (Empresa 
Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária) is the most important implementing agency. It 
has been involved in development cooperation since 1973 and is structured as a 
network of about 50 different research institutions across Brazil. However, it is by no 
means the only implementing agency. For instance in one project, more than 
10 institutions might be involved (such as 16 in the Pro-Savanna  see further  in 
Mozambique).  
 
Another important governmental actor is the Brazilian development bank (BNDES). 
The Bank supports Brazilian private and public companies that want to expand their 
activities (and especially in resource extraction) abroad. In essence BNDES supports 
tied aid: countries can get loans for projects in which Brazilian companies are involved 
(Zilla & Haig, 2012 - cited in Hubner 2012). 
 
1.2.2 The importance of multinational companies and the limited role of civil society 
 
Brazilian multinational companies, including mining companies such as Vale, 
infrastructure companies such as Odebrecht and oil companies such as Petrobras, are 
active in Africa and might have a significant impact on the social-economic 
development of certain regions in the coming years. (Ogier, 2012; Chichava et al., 
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2013, see Figure 1.1). Since development cooperation is seen as an instrument of the 
pursuit of Brazil’s foreign and economic policies it is therefore important to see how the 
interests of these companies influence the overall development cooperation policies. 
Unfortunately, research on this issue is still limited. In health, the Brazilian private 
sector has not been very active in health research due to the already relatively high 
investments by the government. Public sector Brazilian manufacturers are key to the 
Brazilian health system, since they provide affordable medicines and carry out 
research. Together Fiocruz Bio-Manguinhos and Butantan are responsible for 89% of 
all vaccines sales of the Ministry of Health (MIHR, 2005). 
 
Figure 1.1 Large Brazilian companies in Africa 2011 
 
  
Source Chichava et al., 2013: 9 
 
Brazilian civil society organisations are engaged by the government (i.c. the 
presidential secretary) in international cooperation, but there is not much information on 
their involvement in the health and agricultural sectors. This might actually come as a 
surprise, since civil society has been an instrumental player in the development of the 
domestic social and health programmes that have fuelled Brazilian prominence at the 
international level (Campolina, 2012).  
 
1.3 Modalities, instruments and focus areas 
 
1.3.1 Relatively small budget 
 
It is very difficult to find reliable figures about Brazil’s total development cooperation 
budget and more specifically figures for health and AFS assistance. As with the other 
countries in this study, Brazil does not report its ODA and other funds to the OECD-
DAC, and it seems that even within the Brazilian government itself figures are not 
readily available and a lot of confusion exists. Different authors report different figures 
and different shares per modality. The available estimates for ODA hover around US$ 
360 million (IPEA, 2010 and website of the Global Humanitarian Assistance), but there 
are also estimates up to US$ 1.2 billion in commitments (the Economist, 2010; John de 
Sousa, 2010). In comparison, Brazil received US$ 661 million of ODA in 2010.  
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1.3.2 Exporting own claimed success via technical cooperation in social sectors and 
agriculture in Lusophone Africa 
 
Brazil uses a mix of modalities (see Figure 1.2). Export credits are an important 
instrument to promote the investments of Brazilian companies and goods, while 
multilateral cooperation should strengthen the countries role in international institutions. 
 
Figure 1.2 Brazilian development cooperation by modality (budget 2005-2009) 
 
Source Cabral & Shankland, 2012: 6 
 
The most visible part of Brazils development cooperation is however its technical 
assistance. In monetary terms this is actually very small, taking up only 3% of the total 
budget for the period 2005-2009, but it has captured most of the international attention 
(Cabral & Shankland, 2012). While OECD-DAC countries’ development cooperation is 
characterised by the provision of loans and grants, sometimes via budget and sector 
support, the Brazilians are said to export their own claimed successful answers to 
domestic social and economic problems to countries which share a similar historical, 
epidemiologic, ecologic background or/and language (Cabral & Shankland, 2012). 
Government officials and sector specific technicians cooperate with their African peers 
to share experiences and modify the Brazilian know-how in order to fit the local context. 
Brazilian international technical cooperation focuses primarily on Africa (50% of 
cooperation in 2009), Latin America (23%) and the Caribbean (12%). In 2010 the figure 
for Africa amounted to 57%. Especially technical cooperation is aimed at the African 
Portuguese speaking countries (PALOP), which take up 74% of all technical African 
assistance in 2010. Within this group, Mozambique takes the most prominent place 
(Cabral & Shankland, 2012, based on ABC 2011, see Figure 1.3). The Portuguese 
language is an important explanatory factor in Brazil’s geographical focus in general. 
For example within the health sector the Portuguese speaking countries (CPLP) have 
adopted a model based on the joint development of a Strategic Plan of Health 
Cooperation. The Plan identifies ways to ameliorate the health system and to assure 
universal access to health care in the member countries of the CPLP. Technical 
support is provided by Fiocruz and the Portuguese Institute of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine (Buss & Ferreira, 2010). 
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Figure 1.3 Top ten beneficiaries of Brazilian technical cooperation, number of 
cooperation projects in implementation in 2011 
 
Source Cabral & Shankland, 2012: 9, based on ABC, 2011 
 
Agriculture, health and education are the most important sectors of Brazilian’s technical 
assistance, representing respectively 22%, 16% and 12% of the budget between 2003 
and 2010. In Africa, the importance of agriculture even amounted to 26% and health to 
22% (Cabral & Shankland, 2012 - see Figure 1.4). 
 
Figure 1.4  Brazilian technical assistance in Africa, sectorial distribution of 
resources in 2003-2010 
 
Source Cabral & Shankland, 2012, based on ABC, 2011 
 
For technical health assistance, absolute estimates compiled by Russo et al. (2013) 
range from US$ 12 million, to US$ 14 million in the 5 Portuguese speaking African 
countries alone between 2006 and 2009. Again, these figures are still relatively low 
compared to other major health donors. 
 
Based on their own experiences, Brazil promotes intensely different strategies to 
reduce dependency on foreign technology (especially regarding pharmaceutics and 
biotechnology in health), expertise and interests. In practice this implies setting up own 
factories, developing local research capacity, and promoting collaboration between 
local health and agricultural institutions (Russo et al., 2013; Cabral & Shankland, 
2012). The development of master and other courses at universities and research 
institutes in partner countries and the provision of scholarships for short or longer stays 
at Brazilian institutes are an important type of cooperation. As Cabral and Shankland 
(2012) point out, technical cooperation is evolving towards more complex programmes. 
Instead of workshops, study visits and training, larger and longer running programmes 
are set up, such as Bolsa Familia (see below). Moreover, a mix of modalities is 
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introduced, such as a combination of conventional technical cooperation with a credit 
facility to acquire machinery. 
 
1.3.3 … and via global advocacy 
 
Besides technical cooperation with specific countries, Brazilian development 
cooperation is characterised by a strong focus on global diplomacy and advocacy for 
certain issues. This is especially apparent in the health sector, where Brazil has 
adopted a health diplomacy approach (Almeida et al., 2010; Buss, 2011; Buss & 
Ferreira, 2010 and Russo et al., 2013). Health diplomacy refers to the interplay of 
diplomacy, foreign policy interests and global health (Feldbaum & Michaud, 2010 for 
alternative definitions). There are a number of authors, as Russo et al. (2013) have 
identified, who argue that Brazil uses its health cooperation in this sense as a soft 
power tool not only to influence the global health debate but also to support its foreign 
policy interests. 
 
Brazil became a forerunner in health diplomacy, as Vidigal (2010) asserts. On the 
international level, Brazil has lobbied strongly in the UN and the WTO for ameliorating 
the access to medicines and health care. In this context, Brazil has set up the 
International Technical Cooperation Network in 2005, to jointly lobby for flexibilities in 
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (GHSI, 2012). Brazil 
forged academic alliances, such as the Global Health Education Consortium (2010), 
the Consortium of Universities for Global Health (2010) and the Consortium for Global 
Health Diplomacy (2010), (Buss & Ferreira, 2010). Furthermore it has been lobbying for 
a Framework Convention on Tobacco control (GHSI, 2012).  
 
Multilateral cooperation can also be regarded as an instrument in global diplomacy. 
The government finances the Global Fund, the GAVI alliance and the UN (especially 
the WHO, GHSI, 2012  & Deen, 2012). Brazil has given US$ 106 million to these 
agencies between 2006 and 2009. According to GHSI (2012), the most prominent 
initiative is UNITAID. This was launched by Brazil, Chile, Norway and France. It 
developed a funding mechanism, based amongst other instruments on airline fees, to 
facilitate access to essential medicines.  
 
1.3.4 Specific attention for HIV/AIDS and nutrition 
 
Due to the successes in dealing with the domestic HIV/AIDS problematic, Brazil is 
solicited by other countries to export its solutions. In 1996 the Brazilian government 
guaranteed universal access to antiretroviral (ARV) treatment for people with HIV. Its 
strategy consisted of the development of local production of generic HIV medicines, 
lobby at the global level for a decrease in prizes of HIV/AIDS drugs and prevention 
campaigns. This resulted in a lowering of 50% of the AIDS mortality figures in the 
following six years (GHSI, 2012). At the 14th international AIDS conference in 
Barcelona, Brazil presented its successes and started to explore ways in which to 
share its strategies with other countries, first with other Latin American countries and 
later on within Africa. In 2005 it set up the International Centre for Technical 
Cooperation on HIV/AIDS (CICT), a joint initiative of the Brazilian government and 
UNAIDS. It aims to promote sustainable solutions to the HIV/AIDS problematic via 
South-South technical cooperation and has collaborated with 19 countries since 2011. 
A last initiative that received considerable media attention is the creation of a 
US$ 26 million ARV factory in Mozambique that should produce ARV and other 
medicines by 2014. The ultimate objective is to reduce dependency of foreign 
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medicines and to be able to export drugs abroad. Fiocruz is the main Brazilian agency 
involved (GHSI, 2012). 
 
Similarly, Brazil exports its claimed successful programmes in nutrition to fight child 
hunger and domestic poverty. Two major programs include the Bolsa Familia and the 
Brazilian network of human milk banks.  
 
The Bolsa Familia is part of the broader national programme, Fome Zero/Zero Hunger. 
Families are stimulated to send their children to school and to health care by providing 
cash and nutritional subsidies. In the last five years, the Ministry of Social 
Development - with the support of traditional donors, such as the World Bank and 
DFID - has implemented 23 Bolsa Familia like programmes in more than 50 countries. 
In 2008, the UNDP international Poverty Centre even created the Africa-Brazil 
Cooperation Program on Social Development (GHSI, 2012).  
 
The human milk bank programme promotes breastfeeding and collects at the same 
time mother milk and provides these to children without access to this source of 
nutrition. From 2003 onwards it set up milk banks in other Latin American countries in 
collaboration with the respective governments. In 2011, Brazil has signed agreements 
with Mozambique, Cape Verde and Angola to set up human milk banks, provide 
technical training and equipment within two years. Fiocruz is in charge of the 
implementation (GHSI, 2012; Ortiz, 2012). 
 
The Brazilian government supports the development of family farming projects through 
the More Food Programme (Programa Mais Alimentos África) of the Ministry of 
Agrarian Development. This features in an engagement of Brazil towards the FAO to 
assist African countries to obtain food sovereignty. In origin this is a large national 
program, representing investments of US$ 2.3 billion since 2008 in Brazil. During the 
Brazil-Africa dialogue on Food Safety, Hunger Alleviation and Rural Development in 
2010, it was decided to extend this to countries abroad. The programme includes 
technical guidance from Brazilian specialists and of equipment. There are some 
financial conditions attached. The Foreign Trade Board approved a line of credit for 
2011-2012 of US$ 640 million. The funds come from the Bank of Brazil. Producers 
exporting material will have to charge the same prices, and the quality will be 
guaranteed by the government of Brazil. Ghana and Zimbabwe are the first 
participants, but also other countries have showed their interest (Carrieri, 2011 - see 
also Cabral & Shankland, 2012). 
 
In order to strengthen local food markets and improve the food security and prevent 
future food crises, Brazil has set its own national Food Purchase Programme 
(Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos). In origin a Brazilian programme of the Ministry 
of Social Development (MDS). This programme entails the buying of agricultural 
products from smallholders and delivering them to vulnerable population groups, incl. 
children and youth, through school feeding programmes. It is a key aspect of Brazil’s 
Zero Hunger Programme (of which also the Bolsa Familia is a part). In collaboration 
with the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme 
(WFP), this programme will be implemented in five African countries, incl. Malawi and 
Mozambique. Brazil funds the program for US$ 2,375,000. The FAO is in charge of the 
production side and the WFP for the purchase and delivery of the products. Brazil will 
also deliver know-how (FAO, 2012).  
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The Brazilian Cotton-4 project, created in 2006, is a cooperation project with Mali, 
Burkina Faso, Chad and Benin. Embrapa collaborates with research institutes from 
these countries to adapt the cotton generic material of Brazil and in order to improve 
the productivity and quality of cotton production and to enhance research capacities 
(Cabral & Shankland, 2012).  
 
1.3.5 Rising interest in trilateral cooperation 
 
A relatively recent feature of Brazilian development cooperation is the attention for 
trilateral development projects (Bliss et al., 2012). Trilateral cooperation represents one 
fifth of all the ABC’s international cooperation projects and this number will probably 
increase in the future (Cabral & Weinstock, 2010a). Brazil’s cooperation is mostly in 
kind. Japan and the ILO are the main partners. In total, the ABC manages 88 initiatives 
in 27 countries. Mozambique is one of the partner countries. According to Romero 
(2012), Northern donors want to engage in trilateral partnerships with Brazil to build 
relationships with the country, reducing costs in the recipient country; and/or to improve 
development policies and expertise. The author remarks that northern donors assert 
that administrative challenges render this cooperation difficult. 
 
One of the best known examples is the ProSavana programme. This is a trilateral 
cooperation programme between Japan, Brazil and Mozambique. It originated from the 
G8 meeting in Aquila (Global L’Aquila Food Security initiative) and from a similar 
cooperation between Japan and Brazil in Brazil. Embrapa is the Brazilian coordinator. 
The programme aims to turn parts of the savannah in to highly productive arable land 
and also addresses food security. The three components are: research, rural 
extension, and local area development planning. The project implementation started in 
2011, and already US$ 13 million has been pledged by the three partners for a period 
of 5 years. The overall project will last 20 years at least. Additional funds will come from 
Japan and Mozambique (Cabral & Shankland, 2012). 
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2. INDIA 
 
2.1 Historic evolution and principles 
 
2.1.1 India’s development cooperation rooted in the Non-Alignment Movement 
 
India’s health and AFS cooperation is not only smaller in scope but also far less 
documented than that of Brazil and China. India’s general development cooperation 
policies may reveal characteristics of the country’s efforts in health and AFS. Although 
India’s current development cooperation policy is distinct from that of the last century, 
some of its characteristics are rooted in its past. India’s first development cooperation 
efforts and policies already date from right after the country’s independence. Prime 
Minister Nehru was instrumental in the development of these fundamental principles 
which are also inspired by Mahatma Gandhi and the ideology of peaceful co-existence 
(Chaturvedi, 2012b). The first foreign cooperation efforts concentrated on neighbouring 
countries, such as the provision of loans to support infrastructure in Myanmar and 
Nepal. Considering its at times problematic relationships with Pakistan and China, 
fostering pro-India’s sentiments of nearby countries was certainly an important reason 
for these investments suggest Walz and Ramachandran (2011). From the mid of the 
1950s, India acted as a strong advocate of cooperation among developing countries, 
especially those that did not belong to the communist or capitalist block. India was one 
of the main initiators of the Bandung conference in 1955 and the Non-Alignment 
Movement (NAM) in 1961 and the G77 in 1964. The main objective of these initiatives 
was to enhance the voice of developing countries in the global political arena, and to 
promote own solutions to development problems, without having to refer to the main 
power blocks of that time. The principles (see box) decided upon during the Bandung 
conference still live on in India’s development cooperation. 
 
The principles of the Non-Alignment Movement (from the final communiqué of 
the Asian-African conference of Bandung, see The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of Indonesia 1955)  
 
1.  Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and the principles 
of the Charter of the United Nations.  
2.  Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.  
3.  Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large 
and small.  
4.  Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another 
country.  
5.  Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively, in 
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.  
6.  Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the 
particular interests of any of the big powers, abstention by any country from 
exerting pressures on other countries.  
7.  Refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any country.  
8.  Settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement as well as other peaceful means of 
the parties’ own choice, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.  
9.  Promotion of mutual interests and cooperation.  
10.  Respect for justice and international obligation. 
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2.1.2 From recipient to donor 
 
The end of the Cold War and better relations with China and the USA in the 1990s, 
decreased the importance of the ideological discourse and emphasis on representing 
the poorer countries in India’s foreign policy. Also in this decade India liberalised its 
economy and opened it up to foreign investors (Jerve & Selbervik, 2009). Importantly, 
all this time India received far more aid than it disbursed. Between 1955 and 1992 it 
accepted about US$ 55 billion in foreign aid, making it the largest aid recipient in the 
world (GHSI, 2012).The main shift in its foreign policy occurred in 2003, when the 
country launched its Indian Development Initiative. The number of bilateral donors was 
brought back to six (i.e. the USA, the UK, Japan, Germany, Russia and the EU), and 
India started to repay its debts to 15 countries and multilateral institutions such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. India’s economic growth and its 
intention to become a global political player made the country decide to pursue a 
change from net recipient to net donor of aid. It saw development cooperation (again) 
as an important lever to gain economic and political power. However, the bulk (up to 
two thirds of its budget) was invested in the promotion of India as an attractive foreign 
investor. Due to a different view about its objectives, a new government already 
abolished the initiative the following year – although the willingness to become a donor 
remained (Kragelund, 2008). In recent years, India’s development cooperation 
diversified in geographical scope, as well as in modalities and sectors (Chaturvedi, 
2012b). 
 
2.1.3 Between ethical principles and self-interests 
 
As with the western donors and the other countries in this study, the governmental 
discourse might obscure the real motivations for India’s involvement in development 
cooperation. India rejects the terminology and approach used by the traditional (i.e. 
DAC) donor community in its discourse. It refrains from using vocabulary such as 
donor, or ODA, and instead sees itself as a development partner (Chaturvedi, 2012a). 
Central in its discourse are the Bandung Principles of 1955. In its current policy 
declaration, India emphasises the importance of altruism and global responsibility, 
mutual benefit, friendship and cooperation between countries (Jerve & Selbervik, 
2009). Jerve and Selbervik (2009) assert that national self-interests primarily guide 
India’s development cooperation policy. This claim is supported by the observation that 
India is indeed very open and explicit about linking its policy objectives to its national 
interests. These interests include gaining political and economic power on the 
international level, and more specifically obtaining a seat in the UN Security Council. 
The growing global importance of its neighbour, China, accompanied by China’s 
renewed interest in Africa, might also be an explanatory factor, according to Kragelund 
(2010). Development cooperation should therefore be seen as an instrument of India’s 
foreign policy - a statement that the government itself is rather explicit to confirm.  
 
Jerve and Selbervik (2009) point at the duality in its role as a donor and a recipient. 
India has signed the Paris Declaration as a recipient but not as a donor. While India 
stresses the importance of donor coordination for its incoming assistance (e.g. the 
reduction to six bilateral donors), its outgoing assistance does not reflect this same 
concern. Furthermore, the country supports democracy in other countries by giving 
cooperation and advice in the organisation of elections, albeit it believes in non-
interference and respect for other countries’ sovereignty. According to Chanana (2010), 
India’s aid might be unconditional, but it is tied. 
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2.2 Actors 
 
2.2.1 Institutional fragmentation and institutional development 
 
In recent years, the institutional organisation of India’s development cooperation was 
characterised by subsequent rearrangements without consistency. In 2005 for instance 
a Development Partnership Division was created, which later merged with the 
Technical Cooperation Division, while the government announced in 2007 to set up the 
India International Development Cooperation Agency (IIDCA) which should coordinate 
most of India’s international cooperation. However, the IIDCA never saw the light. This 
confusion was detrimental for the planning and the delivery of development 
cooperation. Thus, India’s system is still characterised by its fragmentation. The 
country does not have an overarching development cooperation policy as a donor, nor 
unified legislation or clear goals and objectives. This is in stark contrast to its role as an 
aid recipient (Jerve & Selbervik, 2009). Several ministries play a role in the 
development of aspects of its development assistance and coordination between these 
agencies is limited. Efforts are made to better coordinate its assistance and in a 
renewed effort the government has set up the Development Assistance Partnership 
within the Ministry of External Affairs in 2012 (Chaturvedi, 2012a). But the main 
institution for the development of India’s foreign assistance is still the Ministry of 
External (or Foreign) Affairs. This can be explained by the fact that India regards 
development assistance as an extension of its foreign policy (GHSI, 2012). The 
Ministry of External Affairs is in charge of extending bilateral aid and technical 
assistance (Chaturvedi, 2012b).  
 
The Department of Economic Affairs within the Ministry of Finance is responsible for 
the disbursement of the actual aid, but usually it carries out the recommendations of 
the Ministry of External Affairs. Jerve and Selbervik (2009) note that there is no sign of 
great diverging views on foreign assistance between both agencies.  
 
The Ministry of Commerce is in charge of providing the concessional lines of credit, but 
these are supervised by the Ministry of External Affairs. Other Ministries, such as those 
of Water and Resources, and of Agriculture, also provide funds (Jerve & Selbervik, 
2009). The Exim Bank is the lead financial institutions for financing, facilitating and 
promoting India’s international trade. The administration of the disbursed aid is done by 
India’s embassies and high commissions abroad, however they have no mandate to 
allocate funds.  
 
An important unit within the MEA is the Indian Technical Cooperation (ITEC). This was 
launched in 1964 and is maybe the most known actor in India’s development 
cooperation. It mainly provides technical assistance and training, more specifically the 
training in India of students and personnel for partner countries, study tours and project 
related activities (Agrawal, 2007). However, Chaturvedi (2012a) notes that it has weak 
links with other departments within the Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of 
Finance. According to the author, ITEC’s role in the current evolution in India’s foreign 
assistance programme is limited, despite its long term capacity and competence (see 
also below). 
 
The MEA also supervises the Indian Council of Cultural Relations (ICCR). The ICCR is 
in charge of cultural exchange projects between for instance students and teachers. 
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2.2.2 The central role of the private sector  
 
As Chanana (2010) writes, India ‘never appears alone’. The public sector often 
collaborates with the private sector in development cooperation. This can be explained 
by the strong links between development cooperation and India’s trade and investment 
policies, aimed at opening up new markets. In return developing partners get technical 
cooperation or financial resources. India’s foreign policy focuses amongst other on 
stimulating trade and investments with and in Africa. To promote and facilitate trade 
with Africa, the Indian government has established an information hub on trade in 
Africa, (see http://focusafrica.gov.in). Main sectors include natural resource extraction 
and infrastructure building. Recently, state owned (e.g. Rites and Ircon) and private 
companies (e.g. Tata Group and Mittal Steel) are entering other sectors, such as steel 
mining, transport, banking, and pharmaceutical production. The government acts as a 
facilitator by giving credit via the Exim Bank and lifting regulation and controls on firms 
abroad. In health, the pharmaceutical industry plays a very important role (Chaturvedi, 
2011). For instance, according to GHSI (2012), Indian manufacturers provided 80% of 
all donor-funded HIV/AIDS therapies in developing countries and between 60% and 
80% of all vaccines procured by the UN. Secondly, they also have an impact on 
international rules and regulations regarding Intellectual Property (IP). However, in the 
longer run, it could also turn out that IP regulations on HIV/AIDS drugs would be 
strengthened as a result of India-EU discussions.  
 
According to Travnicek (2012), India is one of the main investors in agricultural land in 
Africa. On the one hand this can be explained by India’s quest for arable land to feed 
its growing population. India is dependent on food imports at the moment. On the other 
hand, it also provides opportunities for Indian companies. According to the Land Matrix 
Database (cited by Travnicek, 2012), India holds some 4.5 million hectares of land in 
Africa, most of which are located in East Africa. In Ethiopia alone for instance, 
80 Indian companies might be involved. The Indian government facilitates this by the 
credit lines of the Exim Bank, conducive legislation, and diplomacy and meetings. The 
Ministry of Agriculture plays an important role in this (Rowden, 2011).  
 
2.2.3 The absence of the NGO sector 
 
Interestingly, the NGO sector is not yet strongly involved in development cooperation, 
according to Jerve and Selbervik (2009). There are almost no NGOs that scrutinise 
India’s development policies and only few or anecdotal evidence of Indian NGOs 
venturing into other development countries (see for instance IANS, 2012). The 
development cooperation of the government does not channel its aid through NGOs, 
except the Red Cross in cases of disaster relief (Price, 2005). 
 
2.3 Modalities, instruments and thematic areas 
 
2.3.1 Despite intentions, India is still a net recipient of aid 
 
It is difficult to determine India’s development assistance budget, since there is no 
systematic reporting of its figures and the figures that are reported are incomplete. 
Furthermore aid and other cooperation flows are often blended together. Kragelund 
(2008) mentions a figure of US$ 1.48 billion in 2007, while GHSI (2012) concludes 
foreign assistance grew from US$ 443 million in 2004 to US$ 680 million in 2010. The 
Global Humanitarian Assistance website mentions a comparable figure of 
US$ 639 million for the same year. This does not include the lines of credit offered by 
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the Exim Bank, albeit credit lines are regarded as one of the main instruments of 
India’s development cooperation. According to Chaturvedi (2012b), the Indian 
government committed about US$ 7.7 billion for these credit lines in 2012. Despite 
India’s intention to become a net donor of aid, its incoming assistance is still several 
times higher, and stood at US$ 2.8 billion in 2010 according to the same website.4 
Again, specific sector-information on health and AFS is missing.  
 
2.3.2 Development cooperation primarily via credit lines and bilateral cooperation 
 
Indian development cooperation encompasses primarily lines of credit with subsidised 
interest rates, soft loans, grants, contributions to international organisations and 
technical cooperation (GHSI, 2012). The first and in monetary terms by far the most 
important are the credit lines. The Export-Import (Exim) Bank is the main institution for 
distribution of these credits. According to Chaturvedi (2012b), the lines of credit have 
facilitated industrial competiveness and improved infrastructure. Importantly, the Exim 
Bank does not determine any content of the borrowing countries. Most of the supported 
projects are within the sectors of energy, railway and construction. Sugar production 
takes up 9% of the credit lines and agricultural and irrigation 8%.  
 
The second instrument that India employs is grants. As Chanana (2010) argues, the 
country cannot afford to give very large grants. Grants have been used to finance a 
range of activities, incl. technical cooperation, scholarships and goods and medicines. 
In recent years there has been an increased attention for region-wide infrastructure 
projects, such as the Pan African e-network (see further) (Chaturvedi, 2012b).  
 
In the early decades of the Cold War, India was a very active promoter of multilateral 
cooperation - especially between countries of the Third World. To a certain extent this 
engagement still continues to this day. India participates actively in many of the 
international organisations and it does not question the need or the utility of them. 
However, it does criticise strongly the dominance of the western countries in these 
institutions and tries to expand its own influence (Chaturvedi, 2012b). It still participates 
in the UN organisations, but is increasingly looking for cooperation with the other 
BRICS countries. According to figures cited by GHSI (2012), India committed about 
US$ 1.4 billion to international finance institutions such as the African and Asian 
Development Banks. In health it is limited to small contributions to the Global Fund, 
UNICEF and UNFPA (Chaturvedi, 2012b; GHSI, 2012). In the last ten years, 
commitments are much lower. In fact most of India’s cooperation is bilateral. This 
allows India’s development cooperation policy to be demand driven and to focus on the 
promotion of India’s private sector involvement (see further). The government reacts to 
calls from recipient countries, instead of pro-actively sending out requests for 
proposals.  
 
2.3.3 ... and its technical cooperation is reknown 
 
India had concluded from its own experience after independence that lack of skills was 
an important obstacle to development. Therefore India’s cooperation had a strong 
focus on skills development. This commitment materialised in the Indian Technical 
Cooperation (ITEC) in 1964 and in participation in international skill development 
programmes, such as the Colombo Plan, and the special Commonwealth for Africa 
programme. Since 1964, ITEC has provided US$ 2 billion of technical cooperation 
                                                     
4
 See www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org 
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through ITEC. Although in absolute figures the amount has increased, the share of 
ITEC activities in the total of development cooperation has decreased in the last 
decade. Nevertheless, in 15 years’ time the number of ITEC trainees grew from about 
400 to more than 2000. About 44% comes from Africa. ITEC has the following 
components: training of nominees of ITEC in India (esp. in technology, investment and 
trade); project-based cooperation, incl. consultancy; deputation of Indians abroad; 
study tours to India (Chaturvedi, 2012b).  
 
2.3.4 Agriculture and ICT among most important sectors 
 
Robust figures about India’s cooperation for specific sectors are difficult to obtain. The 
literature does not seem in agreement about the main focus areas of the Indian 
development cooperation. This might be explained by the fragmentation of its 
cooperation, the absence of a coordinating body and the blurring of the boundaries 
between foreign assistance and foreign policy. There is agreement about the 
importance of infrastructure provision, economic sectors (trade, industry), the IT and 
science sectors as well as agriculture.  
 
Within agricultural policy and research, India is often regarded as a country that can 
share its experiences of its green revolution with other (and especially African) regions. 
Elements include specific equipment, irrigation methods, seed varieties or farming 
methods. However, from the literature it is not clear to what extent Indian governmental 
agricultural assistance is implementing concrete programmes or projects (Kujita, 2011; 
Brown, 2013). The AidData base 5  lists in total 12 different assistance projects or 
programmes between 2005 and 2010. These range from the provision of equipment 
such tractors or pesticide to larger rice cultivation and food processing projects in-
volving up to US$ 36 million - although more info is not provided. Next India provides 
regularly food assistance (up to US$ 50 million), but mainly to neighbouring countries. 
 
One of the main projects of the last years has been the development of the Pan African 
e-Network (see Figure 2.1). This collaborative project between the African Union and 
the Indian government was launched in 2009 and intends to connect hospitals and 
universities of the 53 members of the AU with similar institutions in India via a satellite 
and fibre optic network. India provides a grant of US$ 117 million the implement and 
finalise the project in the following years (Roy, 2012).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5
 http://www.aiddata.org/content/index/data-search#1f0127fb274c1a54d02cde46145748ae, consulted in 
June 2013. 
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Figure 2.1 Indian Pan-African e-network architecture 
 
 
Source www.panafricanenetwork.com 
 
Health is but a relatively small sector within India’s governmental development 
cooperation activities. Besides the fact that the Indian government prefers to focus on 
‘hard developmental’ sectors, this might also be explained by the country’s own 
domestic health challenges. However, some successes in this field especially tropical 
medicine and infectious diseases, public health, training and research and 
development  might provide interesting lessons for other countries. Hence, the health 
sector’s importance in India’s development cooperation policies might increase in the 
future (GHSI, 2012). GHSI (2012) states that the county has pledged at least 
US$ 100 million to bilateral health projects. Most of these projects represent relatively 
small budgets (between US$ 20,000 and US$ 5 million) in comparison to the financed 
projects in other sectors. India provides mainly health infrastructure, such as the 
construction or renovation of hospitals, and medical supplies and equipment, for 
instance medicines, diagnostics, ambulances.6  It also delivers capacity building by 
establishing medical colleges and providing faculty support. At the moment this kind of 
support seems limited to India’s neighbouring countries. On a very small scale, India 
sends out medical missions to Afghanistan and Africa.  
 
2.3.5 Research and development and the potential of frugal innovation  
 
Broader and even more cutting edges are the initiatives regarding frugal innovation 
(low cost solutions for development al problems) in which India is a forerunner. India’s 
technology is supposedly more adapted to African living conditions than that of the 
                                                     
6
 See also www.aiddata.org for a list. 
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DAC countries (Bound & Thornton, 2012). These initiatives include collaborations 
between health services, the IT sector and the mobile phone industry. Several private 
hospitals have engaged themselves in developing frugal innovative solutions and 
sharing these with other institutions abroad. For instance, the largest ophthalmological 
organisation in the world, the Aravind Eye Hospital provides technical cooperation to 
Chinese and Egyptian institutions (GHSI, 2012). It has a long history of providing eye 
care in India at subsidies rates for the poor. According to Chaturvedi and 
Thorsteinsdóttir (2012) it has performed over 3.6 million surgeries and 29 million visits 
to patient. In collaboration with the Bangladeshi Grameen bank, it is reaching out to 
Rwanda and Eritrea. 
 
Arguably the most important activities for global health focus on the promotion of the 
development of drugs and innovative health instruments and biotechnology by 
governmental and private research institutions. In first instance these are directed on 
tackling domestic health challenges, but in the mid-term these solutions will also be 
useful for other countries. For instance, India participates through the India, Brazil, 
South Africa forum (IBSA) in researches on ARV and TB vaccines. The drug 
manufactures Lupin ltd, works together with Farmanguinhos and the Brazilian Ministry 
of Health to develop and introduce TB drugs (GHSI, 2012).  
 
2.3.6 Increased attention for Africa 
 
Although rather small in the beginning, India started to provide aid outside of South 
Asia, especially to Africa. According to Kragelund (2008) this decision should also be 
seen as a response to China’s increasing involvement in Africa in that period. 
Neighbouring countries (Bhutan, Afghanistan, Nepal) are still the foci of India’s 
cooperation. Together with other Asian countries they receive up to 85% of India’s 
cooperation (Walz & Ramachandran, 2010). The remainder goes to Africa. In 2008, 
India organised the India-Africa summit in Delhi. Fourteen African countries 
participated in this summit which was aimed at strengthening partnerships in energy 
trade and cooperation, as well as on climate change, UN reform and combating 
terrorism. The summit resulted in the Delhi Declaration and the Framework for 
Cooperation. These documents identified the major areas for cooperation, including 
agriculture, food security and health. At the second summit held in Addis-Abeba in 
Ethiopia three years later. The Indian government pledged an addition US$ 500 million 
to the already promised US$ 5.4 billion in aid. Trade was intended to grow from 
US$ 45 billion in 2011 to US$ 70 billion in 2015 (Roy, 2012).  
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3. CHINA 
 
3.1 Historic evolution and principles 
 
3.1.1 China: between myths and facts 
 
China 7  has received by far most of the attention in the debate on non-DAC 
development donors. Often the claims made about the involvement of (re-)emerging 
donors can be brought back to concerns about China. And ‘concerns’ is indeed the 
appropriate word here, because the emergence of China in the world economy has 
been looked upon with suspicion by western media and policy makers. This is also the 
case in the field of development cooperation. Alden (2007) concludes that especially 
two negative narratives about China exist: as a colonizer and as an economic 
competitor. Large deals involving an exchange of natural resources for infrastructure 
works between African governments and China - for instance the US$ 9.25 billion 
agreement between China and the DRC in 2008 (Pollet, 2011) - have only fuelled this 
negative publicity. A third more positive narrative also emerged: namely China as a 
development partner - in which China acts as an example for developing countries 
(Alden, 2007; Buckley, 2013).  
 
In addition, some of the literature on China’s development cooperation is based on very 
partial and/or misinterpreted information. This was convincingly demonstrated by the 
American professor Deborah Brautigam in her seminal book ‘The Dragon’s Gift’ 
(Brautigam, 2009) and her blog with the meaningful title ‘China in Africa: the Real 
Story’. Brautigam also emphasised the difficulty of finding robust information about 
China’s policies and practices (2011a: 203): ‘China’s development aid to Africa has 
increased rapidly, yet this might be the only fact on which we have widespread 
agreement when it comes to Chinese aid. Analysts disagree about the nature of 
China’s official development aid, the countries that are its main recipients, the reasons 
for providing aid, the quantity of official aid, and its impact.’ As with Brazil agricultural 
and health assistance are an integral part of China’s development cooperation policy 
and history. 
 
3.1.2 China a fore runner of South-South cooperation: eight principles 
 
China’s development cooperation programme can be traced back to the 1950s (Chin & 
Frolic, 2008). In a first period, spanning roughly three decades, China’s foreign 
assistance policies  as they were communicated by chairman Mao and premier Zhou 
Enlai  were guided by two objectives, according to Zhou (2012). Firstly, the government 
supported countries to become economic and political independent from the western 
block and to develop their own national economies. This featured in the emergence of 
the Non-Alignment Movement, and in the socialist international ideology. Secondly, via 
foreign assistance, China was pursuing its own national economic and political 
interests. Especially, when in the beginning of the 1960s the diplomatic, economic and 
trade relations with the USSR were reduced to a minimum, and the Soviet-Union 
withdrew its assistance to China. Furthermore, development cooperation was seen as 
an instrument in China’s struggle with Chinese Taipei/Taiwan for recognition. In fact 
recognition of the PR China as sole representative of China is also said to be the only 
condition for countries to receive assistance from the PR China. Consequently, China 
                                                     
7
 In this paper ‘China’ refers to the People’s Republic of China (PR China or PRC). 
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set up cooperation projects with almost all African countries - although for some 
countries the assistance was discontinued for periods of time, because they switched 
their diplomatic relationships momentarily to Chinese Taipei (Bautigam, 2009; 2010; 
2011a). Four years later, in 1964, Zhou-Enlai proclaimed its eight principles of 
economic aid and technical to foreign countries. Summarised they include equality, 
mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, use of grants and zero interest loans, easy 
rescheduling, emphasis on building self-reliance, respect for obligations, the same 
standard of living for experts dispatched by China and local experts. Clearly, non-
interference and non-condionality are central issues. These guidelines still govern the 
development cooperation policy in all areas of China today (Pollet, 2011; Alden & 
Large, 2010). These principles are also a major source of inspiration for other countries 
of the South. From her discourse analysis Buckley (2013) concludes that the Chinese 
discourse tends to focus on the inequalities of trade and inefficiencies of post-colonial 
aid, resulting in a radically different, i.e. more equal, win-win and mutual trust, 
relationship with African countries.  
 
Typically, cooperation included Chinese equipment and materials and was geared 
towards productive investments. Infrastructure projects have always been the main 
focus of Chinese aid, with the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway as most 
prominent example (Pollet, 2011). A typical feature of Chinese assistance included the 
sending of medical teams to provide basic health care services (Anshan, 2011). 
Agriculture featured high on the list. China concentrated in the 1960s on the 
construction of large state-owned farms, mirroring the Chinese experiences 
(Brautigam & Tang, 2009). The assistance from China to Africa reached a first high in 
the 1970s. Between 1971 and 1975 it demonstrated levels of 6 to 7% of the national 
budget (Zhou, 2012). The fact that China regained its seat in the UN from Chinese 
Taipei, was instrumental in this evolution. China took over the projects of Chinese 
Taipei and this changed Chinese agricultural assistance into smaller projects, focusing 
on demonstration and extension, and supporting African smallholders instead of state 
production (Brautigam & Tang, 2009). At the same time, Japan and China initiated 
trade relationships. In essence, Japan offered its expertise and technology, and finance 
turnkey projects in exchange for natural resources. Interestingly, this would later on 
form the blueprint for China’s own trade and aid relationships with African countries 
(Brautigam, 2011a). By 1985, China supported agricultural project in 35 countries (25 
in Africa), representing 48,000 hectares of farmland, and up until the 1990s the 
competition with Taiwan remained one of the main driving forces for this engagement 
(Brautigam & Tang, 2009).  
 
3.1.3 Towards efficiency and economic gains 
 
With the accession of Deng Xiaoping to power, China’s development assistance 
entered a new phase (Zhou, 2012). The Open Door policy, started in 1978, 
commenced the transition to a market economy and would eventually gear China’s 
development cooperation and institutional architecture in new directions (Brautigam, 
2011a). It became evident that the projects needed continuous support from China in 
order to survive. For instance, recent studies of the World Bank showed that about half 
of its rural African development projects had failed (Brautigam & Tang, 2009). China 
did not want to give up this support (because of the competition with Taiwan), but 
needed to gain some added value for their own economy. So, the Chinese continued to 
ensure the functioning of existing infrastructure projects, through reparation and 
reconstruction efforts, but looked also for ways to ensure that also China’s economy 
benefitted from its development cooperation investments. The eight principles were still 
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recognised as the core of the development assistance policies, but the focus shifted 
towards efficiency and seeking practical results (Zhou, 2012). The medical health 
teams for instance, stopped to be free of charge and aid figures dropped significantly 
(Huang, 2011). Instead of production, China started to invest in visible landmark 
projects, such as conference centres, stadiums; but at the same time smaller projects 
targeting the improvement of living conditions took the place of other large projects 
(Zhou, 2012).  
 
By the end of the 1990s, China’s economic growth and its emergence as a global 
political and economic power resulted in the launch of the ‘going global strategy’. 
Besides diplomacy, assistance would increasingly be framed in a mutual benefits 
discourse. The strategy entailed that a number of the most promising enterprises were 
singled out to become global multinationals; a focus on high value technology and 
export of services; and increasing investments of Chinese enterprises abroad. This 
paralleled the introduction of new financial instruments and institutions, such as equity 
funds (e.g. the China-Africa Development Fund of the China Development Bank), non-
concessional loans, and a mix of market-rate and preferential export buyer credits 
(Brautigam & Tang, 2009).  
 
3.2 Actors 
 
3.2.1 Centralised system 
 
Foreign assistance in China has been and still is highly centralised. In 1960, the 
Chinese government set up an aid office, directly under the supervision of the State 
Council. The assistance policies were made up by the Central Council and the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, while sector-specific ministries and commissions 
were responsible for its implementation and management. Furthermore, in 1971 it was 
decided that all provinces and the big municipalities would establish offices of 
economic and technical cooperation. For instance, the Ministry of Health managed the 
sending out of medical teams (for a long time the most important feature of China’s 
health assistance). These were organised in such a way that one Chinese province 
would send out a team to one specific African country (Li, 2011). For instance Sichuan 
twinned with Mozambique (Brautigam, 2009). In the 1980s, the Department of Foreign 
Aid was established within a new and larger Ministry responsible for economic relations 
and trade, which later became known as the Ministry of Commerce. The Department of 
Foreign Aid of the Ministry of Commerce is still in charge of the assistance program 
and cooperates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although development cooperation 
projects and funding are also carried out by a variety of different governmental actors 
(see Figure 3.1). The Department of Foreign Aid gives out grants and zero-interest 
loans, and coordinates the youth volunteer programme, as well as the technical 
assistance. It is ‘unbelievably small’, as Brautigam (2009: 109) notes, with a staff of 
about hundred in thirteen different divisions. It coordinates with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Ministry of Finance and the Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank). The latter 
oversees the assessment of projects with concessional loans, and the allocation and 
recovery of loans. The Ministry of Commerce can ask for assistance from the regional 
and local branches and it coordinates with specialised ministries for specific topics. 
Each ministry (also those of health and agriculture) has an international office. The 
concrete management and coordination of projects is carried out by the Chinese 
embassies or consulates. These economic sections of the Chinese embassies assign 
one or two people for management of assistance projects (only Chinese nationals). 
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These are known as the Economic and Commercial counsellor’s offices (Brautigam, 
2011a).  
 
Figure 3.1 Institutional structure of China’s development assistance 
 
Source Brautigam, 2009: 108 
 
In 2011 China’s State Council issued a White Paper on Foreign Aid. This extensive 
paper explains the management, resources, modalities and objectives of its policy. It 
illustrates the growing importance of China’s foreign aid program, and it countered 
critics of the country’s limited transparency about its policies. Chinese development 
cooperation is still based on the eight principles of the Beijing consensus, but - as 
demonstrated in earlier in this chapter, efficiency, and economic self-interest have 
gained prominence, and Brautigam (2011a) argues that Chinese assistance is primarily 
driven by its diplomatic needs. 
 
3.3 Modalities, instruments and thematic areas 
 
3.3.1 Non conditionality 
 
The issue of (non-)interference and (non-)conditionality and the stance of China on this 
has received a lot of attention in the development cooperation world (see for instance 
Brautigam, 2011a). According to critics, the Chinese approach would inhibit democratic 
and governance changes in aid-receiving countries. Zhang & Li (2011) demonstrate the 
differing interpretations and perceptions between China and a DAC-donor, i.e. the EU, 
about conditions or their absence and their supposed benefits in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1 The difference between Chinese and EU perceptions of the EU and 
China’s aid policies 
 China’s perception The EU’s perception 
About 
conditionality 
in the EU’s aid 
policy 
Due to the imbalance between donors and 
recipients, conditionality means interference in 
domestic politics in the recipient countries; 
These conditions may impede the independent 
development of African countries because they 
are not suited to the reality of African countries; 
These conditionalities are the policy tools used 
by the EU to promote its human rights and its 
developmental model; These conditionalities 
also lie at the root of the unequal bilateral 
relations between the EU and African countries. 
The aim of these conditionalities is 
to promote and facilitate reforms in 
the recipient countries; These 
conditions are intended to support 
the sustainable development of 
African countries; These 
conditionalities are based on equal 
negotiation and are not imposed by 
EU. 
   
About 
unconditio-
nally in 
China’s aid 
policy 
Unconditionality reflects China’s respect for 
recipient countries, which may form a basis for 
effective aid; Unconditionality is the only way to 
ensure the independent and sustainable 
development of recipient countries; 
Unconditionality is the prerequisite of African 
democracy; the process of democratisation can 
only be driven by internal forces. 
Unconditionality upsets EU’s 
efforts towards good governance in 
Africa; Unconditionality supports 
African dictatorships; 
Unconditionality delays reform and 
development processes in African 
countries; Unconditionality is only 
for China’s economic and political 
interests. 
Source Zhang & Li, 2011: 89-90 
 
3.3.2 China’s large budget is often overestimated 
 
Several authors have tried to give an overview of China’s official development finance 
and disentangle the different financial flows of its development cooperation (Brautigam, 
2001a; Grimm, 2001; Chin, 2012). In essence, the bulk of China’s development 
cooperation to Africa is not funded through ODA, but via other official flows. This is the 
opposite from DAC countries. Chinese ODA entails grants, zero-interest loans and 
concessional loans. Brautigam (2011a) concluded that in 2008, the country disbursed 
probably about US$ 1.2 billion ODA in Africa and 1.4 billion in 2009. The total for all 
regions would be US$ 3.1 billion in 2008. The Global Humanitarian Assistance website 
gives an estimate of US$ 2 billion for 2010. This is much lower than some estimates of 
other researchers, but this is due to the blurring and blending of development finance 
data. Wrong assumptions (according to Brautigam, 2011a) gave way to an 
overestimation of China’s aid - even up to US$ 17.6 billion for Africa in 2007. In 2011 
grants would still make up 40% of China’s ODA. Since 1995, China committed 
concessional loans to 325 projects (142 completed) in 76 countries. The majority of the 
supported projects were in (economic) infrastructure, followed by industry, energy and 
resource development, agriculture and to a lesser extent health care. According to 
Leung (2010, cited in Mawdsley, 2012), China has supported or funded since 1960 
agricultural projects in 44 African countries and one in five turnkey projects were in this 
sector (Brautigam, 2011a).  
 
3.3.3 Growing significance of Africa 
 
Africa gained prominence in China’s foreign policy and in trade relations (Eisenman, 
2012). Although it might be even more correct to note that it was always an important 
partner region of China, but that in the 2000s finally the western countries took notice 
of this (Pollet, 2011). A diplomatic surge started in the 2000 with a series of diplomatic 
visits and organisations of meetings (the High Level Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC)) in Bejing (2000, 2006 and 2012), Addis Abeba (2003) and 
Sharm-el-Sjeik (2009) (Li, Liu et al., 2012). Specifically for health, China organises 
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roundtable with government representatives from African countries, i.e. the China-
Africa health Cooperation roundtables. A taskforce comprised of Chinese government 
officials and technical institutions and supported by several multilateral institutions, 
including the WHO, UNFPA and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The most 
recent one was in Botswana, the China Chamber of Commerce and the Institute of 
Global Health of Bejing University. The objective is to support local production of health 
products and share expertise on HIV/AIDS (Ventures Africa, 2013 & Li, 2013). 
 
3.3.4 The different modalities of Chinese assistance 
 
China’s development assistance takes eight different forms. Typically in all of them is 
that its assistance is informed by China’s own experiences in overcoming 
developmental challenges (Buckley, 2013). The pledges made at the last FOCAC 
forum regarding ‘agriculture and food security’ and ‘health and medical care and public 
health’ are listed in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2 Pledged actions regarding agriculture and medical care and public 
health made by China in the Bejing Action Plan (2012-2015) 
presented at the FOCAC Forum in 2012 
Sections Pledges 
4.1.3 Support of the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP) 
 
4.1.4 Send teams to train African agricultural technicians 
 
4.1.4 Support agricultural vocational education system and send teachers 
 
4.1.4 & 5.2.1 & build more agriculture demonstration centres 
 
4.1.4 Provide technical support for grain planting, storage, processing and circulation 
 
4.1.4 & 4.5.6 Encourage Chinese financial institutions to support corporate cooperation in planting 
processing, animal husbandry, fisheries and aquaculture 
  
4.1.4 Support UNFAO ‘Special Program for Food Security’ 
  
4.1.5 & 4.1.6 Facilitate access for African agricultural products to the Chinese market 
  
4.5.2 US$ 20 billion credit line for infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing and African 
SMEs 
  
5.2.2 Implement the ‘African Talents Program’. In the next three years, China will train 
30,000 African professionals in various sectors, offer 18,000 government scholarships 
and take measures to improve the content and quality of the training programs 
  
5.5.2 Will step up high level exchanges in the health field and hold a China-Africa high-level 
health development workshop at an appropriate time 
  
5.5.3 Expand their exchanges and cooperation in the prevention, treatment and port control 
of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other major communicable diseases, health 
personnel training, maternal and child health, health system building and public health 
policies 
  
5.5.4 Continue to provide support to the medical facilities it has built in Africa to ensure their 
sustainable development and upgrade the modernisation level of the hospitals and 
laboratories 
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5.5.5 Continue to train doctors, nurses, public health workers and administrative personnel 
for African countries 
  
5.5.6 Conduct the ‘Brightness Action’ campaign in Africa to provide free treatment for 
cataract patients 
  
5.5.7 Continue to send medical teams to Africa. In this respect, it will send 1,500 medical 
workers to Africa in the next three years 
  
6.3.6 Publish and translate agricultural technology materials; joint participation in book 
fairs in China & Africa 
Source FOCAC, 2012; Buckley, 2013 
 
The most visible are the ‘complete projects’. These are mainly infrastructure works -
 also in health care and agriculture  in which the Chinese develop, manage and 
implement the whole or part of the project. This includes the sending of technical 
personnel and equipment and material. Once the project is finished it is handed over to 
the partner country. ‘Complete projects’ account for 40% of China’s assistance. The 
Government of the PR China (2011) claims to have assisted in the construction of over 
2,000 projects by the end of 2009. China had funded the construction and equipment of 
more than 100 hospitals of which 54 in Africa. In addition it built pharmaceutical 
factories in three African countries and enlarged clean water supplies in nine 
(Brautigam, 2011b). The construction of farmland irrigation and water-conservancy 
projects is also mentioned in the White Paper.  
 
The other seven forms include goods and materials, technical cooperation, human 
resource development cooperation, medical teams (see further), emergency 
humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries and debt relief.  
 
Medical teams are at the core of China’s health assistance policy. Already from 1963 
China sends out teams of 15 to 25 physicians, laboratory technicians and assistance. 
They provide free health care, and train local medical staff. This aid is certainly not 
limited to Africa, but is sent out to disaster struck areas. In 2009 for instance, China 
sent out 2,100 medical workers to 69 countries (GHSI, 2012). According to calculations 
of Li (2011) at least 20,000 medical team members of China have worked abroad and 
treated 240 million patients, primarily in Africa. As with the medical teams China also 
sends out agricultural teams, consisting of agro-technicians and senior agricultural 
experts. Unfortunately we do not have information on exact numbers. They offer 
consultations on rural development, and training agricultural personnel (PRC, 2011).  
 
Capacity building does not only occur through the medical teams, but also via the 
provision of scholarships for students to study in China (GHSI, 2012). Topics for short 
term training programs (about a month) in health for instance include family planning, 
malaria treatment and prevention, traditional Chinese medicine. Training in agricultural 
issues is also offered in China. Between 2003 and 2008, more than 4,000 Africans 
participated in these courses (Brautigam, 2011b). At the UN High-Level Meeting on the 
Millennium Development Goals in 2010, China pledged to train a further 5,000 people.  
 
To share Chinese experiences with African researchers and farmers, China is building 
more than 20 agricultural demonstration centres in Africa. These centres mix business 
and aid aspects. (Chichava et al., 2013; Brautigam, 2011a). At the same UN High level 
meeting, China promised to build in total 30 centres in different development countries. 
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In addition to these centres, also farms and experiment and promotion stations of agro-
technology are built (PRC, 2011). 
 
Within health, China focuses specifically on malaria and reproductive health. For over 
three decades, China support malaria control programmes and efforts (Li; 2011). This 
is based on its own experience and on its own supply of artemisinin, a product derived 
from a plant which is used in anti-malaria medicines, and used. Important is also the 
approval of medicine by the WHO in 1993, resulting in the requirement of all Chinese 
medical teams to use this medicine. Malaria is also one of the key policy platforms 
within FOCAC. China even pledged about US$ 100 million for 30 malaria treatment 
centres and other malaria programmes. According to GHSI (2012) these initiatives are 
not integrated within global programmes.  
 
Reproductive health is another feature of China’s health assistance. For this issue, 
China does participate actively in international initiatives, such as the Partners in 
Population and Development. More specifically, the country has donated reproductive 
health technologies and assistance in the building of family planning clinics (GHSI, 
2012).  
 
Moreover, China’s research and development on medicines and control and prevention 
of infectious diseases is already an important domestic project, but it will increasingly 
impact on global health issues in the future (GHSI, 2012).  
 
3.3.5 And the mixing of aid with other development modalities 
 
Typically about Chinese development cooperation is the mixing of aid with other 
development cooperation modalities. This makes it very difficult to delineate exactly the 
aid efforts of China, and consequently gives rise to a lot of confusion about Chinese 
aid. China’s bilateral aid is tied, in the sense that materials for projects that are funded 
through grants and zero-interest loans should be bought from a list of Chinese firms 
(Brautigam, 2011b). 
 
Other official flows include credits to assist companies in buying Chinese goods, or 
Chinese companies to finance foreign sales, official loans at commercial rates, and 
strategic lines of credit to companies which the Chinese government deem to become 
multinationals. Figures on these flows are scarce, but according to Brautigam (2011a) it 
may add up to a commitment US$ 10 billion to Africa in 2010 and strategic packages of 
US$ 10 to 30 billion to multinationals. In the 1990s, three policy banks were set up to 
managed new financial instruments, such as equity funds (e.g. the China-Africa 
Development Fund of the China Development Bank), non-concessional loans, and a 
mix of market-rate and preferential export buyer credits. Importantly, these are not 
qualified as ODA, but some researchers have erroneously done so. In terms of 
management, Chinese companies set up joint ventures with African companies, 
created construction companies which could do contract work, and took up leases on 
their old projects (Brautigam & Tang, 2009; Gu, 2009; Zhou, 2012). In agriculture for 
instance, assistance with Africa became increasingly linked to agribusiness develop-
ment (Mawdsley, 2012). Besides joint ventures, agro-technology demonstration 
centres, research facilities and training, agricultural elements of free trade zones were 
set up. Nevertheless, several authors (for instance Li et al., 2012), argue that African 
countries can also benefit from the Chinese experience in sustaining and improving the 
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small holder agricultural systems. The Chinese government encourages agricultural 
investment in Africa and is offering specific incentives. This has also raised questions 
about land grabbing (Brautigam & Tang, 2009). China needs to feed about one fifth of 
the global population, while it only possesses 7% of the world’s arable land. This 
conclusion together with China’s interest in agriculture in Africa, has given rise to 
accusations of China grabbing land in African countries in order to cultivate and export 
the staples to feed its own populace. The debate is still ongoing, but it is marred by 
inadequate field data. For Mozambique, Ekman has for instance compiled information 
that does not uphold these accusations for the Mozambican context (Brautigam & 
Ekman, 2012; Ekman, 2012). 
 
In health a shortlist of suppliers of domestic drugs and material was developed, and 
joint ventures of hospitals and pharmaceutical firms were created. The health 
assistance diversified in managing hospitals and delivering services, as well as 
promoting the export of China’s pharmaceuticals (Huang, 2011). China is one of the 
main manufactures of drugs and vaccines. At the moment these are still mainly for the 
domestic market. In the future, the enterprises might be expanding their activities 
abroad, once they have tackled obstacle, such as the limited knowledge of the English 
language and international legislations. Some international organisations and 
foundations (incl. the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) are assisting them in the 
process (GHSI, 2012).  
 
3.3.6 Bilateral aid dominates, but first steps in trilateral assistance 
 
China’s assistance is mainly directed through bilateral channels. It does not give 
budget or sector support or hardly participates in donor coordination initiatives – 
although this seems to change. In health China concentrates on public health 
preparedness and disease surveillance (more specifically on influenza and emerging 
infectious diseases). Although most of its assistance is bilateral, the country also 
supports multilateral organisations, i.c. UNICEF and to a much lesser extent the Global 
Fund, UNFPA, UNAIDS. However, it is still a much larger receiver from these funds. 
Recently, China’s relationships with the Global fund have deteriorated due to 
(supposedly) misappropriation of funds. In the WHO, China’s influence and 
commitments are growing, especially since Margaret Chan (Hong Kong’s director of 
health during the SARS outbreak in 2006) became Director-general of the institution in 
2006, A position for which China has lobbied intensively. China is also stimulating the 
dialogue on tuberculosis, avian influenza and human influenza because of its own 
problems with the diseases. Notwithstanding this growing participation in multilateral 
organisations, most of its bilateral programs are still implemented in isolation from 
similar global efforts (GHSI, 2012).  
 
The OECD-DAC has made efforts to coordinate and discuss development cooperation 
practices through the China-DAC study group, which brings together DAC donor 
agencies and China. Furthermore China has pledged or committed funds to various 
multilateral institutions and since 2005 it has exchanged with various international 
organisations. Tripartite cooperation programs are especially apparent in the 
agricultural sector. The most prominent example is the FAO’s Special program on Food 
Security in Africa, which matches countries of the South who want to collaborate with 
other developing countries on food security. All three partners (the two countries and 
the FAO) share the costs (Mawdsley, 2012). 
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4. SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1 Historical evolution 
 
4.1.1 The newest BICS on the block 
 
Of the four countries in this study, South Africa’s development cooperation architecture 
and policies are the most recent. Moreover, of the four countries it is by far the least 
active in health and agricultural assistance. The apartheid regime did assist other 
African countries to gain political support but its policies are markedly different from the 
current era. With the transition to democracy in 1994, the foreign and development 
cooperation policies had to be redeveloped. In fact, its development cooperation really 
took shape during Thabo Mbeki’s presidency in 1999. President Thabo Mbeki launched 
the concept of African Renaissance, which entailed ‘the reclamation of Africa’s right to 
chart its own destiny, the promotion of political democracy, the eradication of neo-
colonial relations, and the advancement of people centred economic growth and 
development’. The policy was clearly aimed at making South Africa the leading power 
on the African continent (Kragelund, 2010). A budget - the African Renaissance 
Fund (ARF) - was made free to implement projects pursuing this objective. The ARF 
was set up within the Department of Foreign Affairs, which in turn was replaced with 
the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) in 2009.  
 
4.2 Actors 
 
4.2.1 An institutional structure in evolution 
 
South Africa’s development cooperation policy is set out by the DIRCO. Besides the 
ARF, a variety of other governmental agencies and ministries financed and set up 
development assistance projects. To ameliorate the coordination and implementation 
of its development cooperation efforts, the government intends to set up a separate 
agency for development cooperation receiving policy direction from the DIRCO: the 
South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). SADPA will manage an 
independent Partnership for Development Fund that will replace the African 
Renaissance Fund (Vickers, 2012). The SADPA will coordinate outgoing and incoming 
assistance.  
 
Sidiropoulous (2012) notes that a variety of other actors run different development 
projects - including more than ten government departments, ministries, agencies and 
research institutes. In addition, development finance institutions are involved, such as 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) and the Industrial Development 
Cooperation (IDC). The DBSA funds projects in different sectors, incl. health, but 
mainly in infrastructure development in SADC countries. In 2001 it also established a 
new infrastructure trust fund of more than US$ 100 million to support infrastructure 
development along Africa’s North South axis. The IDC extended its mandate in 2001 to 
the whole of Africa and supports amongst other areas, health and agricultural projects. 
It has a collaboration with the Brazilian BNDES for a hydroelectric plant in Mozambique 
in 2008 and a hospital in Zambia. 
 
South Africa invests in infrastructure through its state owned enterprises, such as 
Eskom (energy) and Transnet (transport), but it is not clear in how far the private sector 
is involved in South Africa’s development assistance (Vickers, 2012). South Africa is 
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known for its strong civil society - although it is only marginally involved in development 
cooperation. Habib (2005, cited in Leys, 2008) divides this in three groups. A first 
consists of large formal NGOs. They work together with the government in policy 
formulation, implementation and service delivery. Some are also active abroad, esp. in 
other African countries. ACCORD and the Institute for Global Dialogue work on conflict 
prevention. A second group refers to activist social groups, often opposing the 
economic policies of the government. They have linked with other international 
movements, such as trade unions. The third group entails smaller organisations 
focusing on poverty alleviation of marginalised groups. They cannot be found abroad. 
  
4.3 Principles, modalities, instruments and thematic areas 
 
4.3.1 Ubuntu as guiding philosophy, but own interests are not forgotten 
 
The DIRCO defines development cooperation ‘as the cooperation between developing 
and developed countries in the field of aid, trade, security and politics to promote 
economic and social well-being in developing countries’ (DIRCO, 2011). South Africa 
prefers the term development partner over aid donor. Several authors, such as 
Kragelund (2010) and Vickers (2012), argue that South Africa’s development 
cooperation policy is an inherent part of its foreign policy and reflects solidarity and 
self-interest.  
 
Since the end of the Apartheid, the foreign policy of the new ruling party, the ANC, 
reflected as well as gratitude for supporting the anti-apartheid struggle, as a moral 
obligation towards assisting other African countries. For instance, very rapidly after 
coming to power, the ANC cancelled the debt of Mozambique and Namibia. South 
Africa’s government calls this the politics of Ubuntu. In the White Paper on Foreign 
Policy this concept is explained as follows: ‘in the modern world of globalisation, a 
constant element is and has to be our common humanity. We therefore champion 
collaboration, cooperation and building partnerships over conflict. This recognition of 
our interconnectedness and interdependency, and the infusion of Ubuntu into the 
South African identity, shapes our foreign policy. The philosophy of Ubuntu means 
humanity and is reflected in the idea that we affirm our humanity when we affirm the 
humanity of others’ (DIRCO, 2012: 4). 
 
Mutual interest has become another core element of its policy. Some argued that South 
Africa’s efforts did not benefit its own private sector or other interests. Despite a 
successful track record in for instance peace building, other countries seized the 
benefits afterwards (Vickers, 2012). South Africa’s commitment to development 
cooperation might be endangered, as Leys (2008) asserts, by the country’s own socio-
economic challenges. Public support to address poverty and other socio-economic 
problems abroad might be low, as long as large inequalities exist in South Africa itself. 
Consequently, economic diplomacy has now gained ground in South Africa’s foreign 
policy (Vickers, 2012).  
 
The selection of projects and programmes is demand driven, reactive, and ad hoc, 
according to Vickers (2012). An advisory committee, consisting of members of the 
DIRCO, the National Treasury and the Department of Trade and industry recommends 
projects to the Ministers of International Relations and Cooperation and Finance. 
Nevertheless, there is no project management office nor methodology to select and 
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manage projects in order to the achieve the main objectives of South Africa’s foreign 
policy. Furthermore the coordination between the DIRCO and the National Treasury is 
haphazard according to the same author. The author continues his critique by 
mentioning that the monitoring and evaluation of projects and programmes is poor.  
 
It is intended that the SADPA will address these problems and enhance the 
effectiveness of South Africa’s development assistance policy. Within its new Strategic 
Plan 2013-2018, in which the establishment of SADPA is formalised, the DIRCO notes 
as main objective the promotion and protection of South Africa’s national interests, as 
well as an engagement for multilateralism and continental and global development. 
Bilateral agreements and high level visits will form the main bases of cooperation. 
Specific attention is given to strengthening South-South relationships, especially in 
political and economic domains. The SADPA will not disburse loans, but will support 
South African financing institutions. Most probably the SADPA will focus on grants and 
technical assistance as modalities. The African Platform for Development Effectiveness 
will guide the policies. This was adopted at Busan in 2011, and moves the focus from 
aid to development effectiveness (Vickers, 2012).  
 
In its rhetoric South Africa subscribes itself to international rules, democracy and 
human rights, however it does not place conditionalities on its assistance Leys (2008). 
 
4.3.2 Peacekeeping and conflict prevention and regional integration are main foci 
 
South Africa’s intervention areas were clearly informed by its own transformation and 
democratisation processes. It wanted to share these experiences with other nations, 
but the range of supported projects and programmes is very wide-spread and reflects 
the lack of focus. The African Renaissance Fund provided mainly grants for 
interventions aiming at the following objectives (DIRCO, 2011):  
 cooperation between South Africa and other countries; 
 promoting democracy and good governance; 
 preventing conflict and assisting with conflict resolution; 
 socioeconomic development and integration; 
 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Africa; 
 technical assistance and capacity-building, specifically in terms of human resource 
development, management training and scholarships. 
 
The focus on peace and conflict resolution is demonstrated in various ways. South 
Africa is the largest contributor to the African Union (AU) and hosts the Pan-African 
Parliament. Second, it has mediated in several African conflicts and participated and 
supported peacekeeping operations of the AU and the UN. Third, it has supported 
post-conflict reconstruction, electoral reform. Its support focuses thus mainly on 
institutional capacity building and governance, rather than infrastructure provision and 
building.  
 
A second major focus is political and economic regional integration, most notably 
through the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the 
Tripartite Free trade Area in Southern and Eastern Africa. South Africa also invests in 
infrastructure building through its state owned enterprises, such as Eskom (energy) 
and Transnet (transport), and development finance institutions, such as DBSA and 
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IDC. In addition, the Department of Trade and Industry has supported the Spatial 
Development Initiative from 1996 onwards. This model entails the development of 
geographic zones with economic potential. Mozambique is for instance one of the 
countries which will be targeted in the next years. Lastly, South Africa supports very 
large continental initiatives through the Presidential Infrastructure Championing 
Initiative (Vickers, 2012). Also at the global level the country emphasises the 
importance of participating in the global governance system, and its commitment to 
multilateralism and the UN-system (DIRCO, 2013). 
 
4.3.3 Small budget 
 
Due to the lack of a centralised accounting system it is difficult to determine the total 
budget for development cooperation. South Africa’s development cooperation budget is 
increasing, but still remains small in comparison to other countries in our study. One 
estimate of Alden and le Pere (2010, cited in Vickers, 2012) placed South Africa’s 
development cooperation in 2004 at US$ 1.6 billion, but this is surely an 
overestimation, because it would imply that South Africa’s aid would be higher than that 
of Brasil and India. GHSI (2012) gives a figure of 433 million, but also here it is not 
clear on what it is based. The Global Humanitarian Assistance website placed the out-
going aid at a mere US$ 98 for 2010, representing a feeble 0.03% of GNI and about 
ten times less than its incoming assistance. Also in health South Africa receives much 
more than it gives out.  
 
4.3.4 Limited focus in health and AFS 
 
South Africa’s main domestic health challenges, and esp. the HIV/AIDS problematic, 
prevent the country from investing heavily in foreign assistance. There is also no 
sufficient public support to redirect public funds abroad. Nevertheless, South Africa’s 
government allocates limited bilateral and multilateral assistance. Due to the 
fragmentation of its aid policies, it is difficult to find data. Bilateral assistance is in ad 
hoc technical support on malaria control in for the SADC countries. Multilateral 
assistance is primarily to the GAVI alliance (US$ 20 million in 20 years from 2006 
onwards) and the Global Fund (US$ 10 million between 2003-2007). Support amounts 
US$ 10 to 20 million. Within IBSA, South Africa works together with India on research 
into vaccines against HIV/AIDS and TB (GHSI, 2012). 
Despite the absence of a foreign assistance health policy, its own model of addressing 
the HIV/AIDS and TB challenges has significant influence for other countries dealing 
with similar problems, according to GHSI (2012). Especially research, advocacy and 
policy are areas in which South Africa stands out as model for other countries.  
 
There is very little literature on specific assistance projects and programmes in other 
sectors. For agriculture we only found that the department of agriculture collaborates 
with other African countries on capacity building projects, often on phyto and sanitary 
measures (Braude et al., 2008). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The objective of this paper was to provide insight in Brazil, India, China and South 
Africa’s engagements and features in development cooperation in health and AFS 
based on the available written information sources. A first conclusion is that the BICS’ 
involvement in these specific sectors is to a large extent embedded in their general 
development cooperation policies. Table 5.1 summarises therefore the main features 
(based on the info in the country studies) of the countries’ development cooperation.  
The BICS development cooperation shows a number of similarities and dissimilarities. 
First, the BICS are by no means a new actor in development cooperation, although 
their current involvement may differ significantly from that in previous decades. 
Secondly, the BICS development cooperation budget is not restricted to official 
development aid, but goes beyond this financial flow. Third, the institutional set-up of 
the BICS development cooperation is to a large extent still in evolution and involves a 
multitude of governmental actors. Fourth, the discourse of the BICS is markedly 
different from that of the OECD-donors (and moreover, the BICS do not consider 
themselves as donors). Fifth, the modalities and instruments do not only differ among 
the BICS, but also between the BICS and the OECD-donors in various ways. In the 
second research paper, these issues will be elaborated in more detail for the BICS and 
other non-DAC development actors in general. 
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Table 5.1 Main features of the development cooperation of the BICS 
 Brazil India China South Africa 
Aid (in 
US$)
8
 
Estimates range from 
362 million (2009) to 
1.2 billion (2010) 
Estimates range 
from 639 million 
(2009) to 1.48 billion 
(2007) 
Estimates range from 2 billion 
(2010) to 3.1 billion (2008) 
Lot of confusion, 
estimates around 
US$ 100 million 
     
Govern-
mental 
institutional 
structure 
(leading 
actor) 
Fragmented and 
implementation 
carried out by sector 
specific actors  
(Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Agência 
Brasileira do 
Cooperação) 
Very fragmented 
and in process of 
change 
(Ministry of External 
Affairs) 
Highly centralised structure and 
implementation decentralised. 
(Department of Foreign Aid of 
the Ministry of Commerce) 
In process of 
change 
(DIRCO and in the 
future SADPA) 
     
Principles Solidarity, mutual 
benefit, demand 
driven, non-condi-
tionality, non-
interference, 
recognition of local 
expertise 
Solidarity, mutual 
benefit 
Equality, mutual benefit, respect 
for sovereignty, non-
condionality, emphasis on 
building self-reliance, the same 
standard of living for experts 
dispatched by China and local 
experts 
Solidarity, mutual 
benefit, ‘Ubuntu’ 
     
Main 
financial 
instru-
ments 
Concessional loans 
and grants 
Export credits, 
concessional loans 
and grants. 
Integration of 
commercial finance 
and aid 
Grants, credit lines, interest free 
loans and concessional loans, 
but Other Official flow more 
important than ODA. Integration 
of commercial finance and aid 
Grants and loans 
     
Main 
modalities 
Technical assistance, 
scholarships, 
humanitarian 
assistance, global 
advocacy 
Scholarships, 
technical 
assistance, humani-
tarian assistance 
‘Complete projects’, technical 
assistance, equipment, capacity 
building, emergency aid, 
volunteer programs 
Projects, technical 
cooperation, 
humanitarian 
assistance 
     
Main types 
of coopera-
tion 
Bilateral, multilateral 
and trilateral 
Bilateral Bilateral Bilateral, 
multilateral 
trilateral 
     
Country 
focus 
Latin America and 
African countries 
(Lusophone in 
particular) 
Neighbouring coun-
tries and Africa 
Global, but increasingly Africa Africa 
     
Main 
sectors 
Health, education, 
agriculture, social 
security  
Agriculture, infra-
structure, economic 
sectors and ICT 
Infrastructure, productive 
sectors, agriculture, energy, 
health and agriculture 
Post-conflict 
resolution, peace-
building, regional 
integration 
Source for specific references: see the country studies 
 
Sector specific information on the BICS’ development cooperation still shows important 
gaps, especially in committed or disbursed budgets. Moreover, South Africa is only 
partially engaged in the sectors, and for India the lack of data prevents a profound 
understanding of their involvement in the health and AFS (although also for Brazil and 
China information is not widespread). Table 5.2 summarises the findings for the 
sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8
 In brackets the year to which estimate refers to. 
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Table 5.2 Main features of the development cooperation in health and AFS of 
the BICS 
 Brazil India China South Africa 
Aid disbursed 
for health and 
AFS 
No information available on total budget for specific sectors for individual countries. Only partial 
information on specific projects, particular types of aid and pledged loans 
  
Leading 
governmental 
actors  
Fragmented, but main 
actors are Ministry of 
External Affairs, ABC, and 
Ministry of Health and 
Fiocruz for health, and 
Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Supply and 
the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development and 
Embrapa 
Not clear, though 
Ministry of External 
Affairs has important 
role 
Centralised, 
Department of 
Foreign Aid of the 
Ministry of 
Commerce and 
Ministry of Health 
and of Agriculture 
DIRCO and in the 
future SADPA 
     
Main 
modalities 
Technical assistance, 
scholarships, research and 
development, trilateral 
cooperation projects, 
Export of domestic social 
programmes, global 
diplomacy 
Lines of credit, 
concessional loans, 
scholarships 
Complete projects, 
lines of credit, 
technical assistance 
(agricultural 
demonstration 
centres, medical 
and agricultural 
teams) 
concessional loans, 
scholarships, 
research and 
development 
Infrastructure 
     
Main domains 
in AFS 
Agricultural production, 
agro-business, small scale 
farming, nutritional 
programs, cotton 
Cotton, frugal 
innovation, ICT 
Agricultural 
production, agro-
business, small 
scale farming 
 
     
Main domains 
in health 
Infrastructure provision 
(hospitals, pharmaceutical 
factories), HIVA/AIDS, 
provision of medicines, 
public health, tobacco 
control 
ICT, tele-medicine, 
frugal innovation, 
manufacturing and 
provision of drugs 
Malaria control, 
reproductive health, 
manufacturing and 
provision of drugs 
HIV/AIDS 
Source for specific references: see the country studies 
 
How the Non-DAC development partners and specifically Brazil, India, China and 
South Africa are supposedly challenging the ‘traditional’, i.e. DAC, donors, is the 
subject of the second research paper. The third and fourth research papers will attempt 
to fill some of the gaps in the sector specific knowledge, and will map the activities of 
the BICS in the health sector in Mozambique, and the AFS in Malawi. Contrary to the 
first two research papers, the information will not be entirely based on written sources 
but also on interviews carried out during field work in both countries. 
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